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The Double Challenge of Transformation and Integration:  






While the DPRK (North Korea) is on its way ahead to reform the socialist based eco-
nomic system, since a few years the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is integrating 
into East Asian economic structures like “ASEAN plus 3”. In this way a possible re-
unification of Korea as well as a single transformation process in North Korea in the 
near future will be connected closely with the question of economic integration in 
Northeast Asia. Fortunately, this situation is not singular in economic history but has 
some models in Europe. For instance, in 1990 Germany reunified during an important 
deepening phase of the European Union. When Western and Eastern Germany be-
came unified in 1990, Western German political, economic and social institutions 
were transferred to the former German Democratic Republic (Eastern Germany) by a 
one-to-one imitation process. The institutional transfer from Western Germany to the 
“Neue Bundesländer” (new federal states) meant that Eastern Germans had to ac-
cept not only Western German laws, legal norms, organizations as a whole. Addi-
tionally, East Germany had to accept the “acquis communautaire”, the set of rules of 
the European Union. Considerable changes were achieved and Eastern Germans 
today enjoy a standard of living much higher than in all other transformation states in 
Central and Eastern Europe. But also problems of the coincident process of trans-
formation and integration must be mentioned. As will be discussed in this paper les-
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The Double Challenge of Transformation and Integration:  
German Experiences and Consequences for Korea 
 
 
1.  Transformation and Integration: a double challenge 
 
While the DPRK (North Korea) is on its way ahead to reform the socialist based eco-
nomic system, since a few years the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is integrating 
into East Asian economic structures like “ASEAN plus 3”. In this way a possible re-
unification of Korea as well as a single transformation process in North Korea in the 
near future will be connected closely with the question of economic integration in 
Northeast Asia.  
 
Fortunately, this situation is not singular in economic history but has some models in 
Europe. For instance, in 1990 Germany reunified during an important deepening 
phase of the European Union. When Western and Eastern Germany became unified 
in 1990, Western German political, economic and social institutions were transferred 
to the former German Democratic Republic (Eastern Germany) by a one-to-one imi-
tation process. The institutional transfer from Western Germany to the “Neue Bunde-
sländer” (new federal states) meant that Eastern Germans had to accept not only 
Western German laws, legal norms, organizations as a whole. Additionally, East 
Germany had to accept the “acquis communautaire”, the set of rules of the European 
Union. Considerable changes were achieved and Eastern Germans today enjoy a 
standard of living much higher than in all other transformation states in Central and 
Eastern Europe. (Seliger and Wrobel 2000: 10) But also problems of the coincident 
process of transformation and integration must be mentioned. 
 
It is the purpose of this paper to compare the transformation in Germany under the 
restriction of European integration with the situation in Northeast Asia. Definitely, the 
situation in Europe is not comparable to Northeast Asia in detail, but on the other 
hand, German unification may be a model for each kind of peaceful unification as   3
well as transformation under the restrictions of the European integration process. 
(Seliger and Wrobel 2000: 8) Thus the focus of this paper is not only internationally 
comparative. The researched political and economic relations are also double-sided. 
While integration processes influence transformation, transformation processes 
themselves have effects on the integration process. In this way, the German experi-
ence will help to analyze the questions in which way South Korean economic integra-
tion will influence a prospective Korean reunification (and North Korean transforma-
tion) and on the other hand in which way a Korean reunification will influence eco-
nomic integration in Northeast Asia. The German experience might hold valuable les-
sons for Korea. 
 
 
2.  Transformation and integration: Germany and Korea compared 
 
Nowadays, the Korean situation is quite similar to the German case before 1990. Like 
Germany in the past Korea nowadays is divided into a successful market economy 
and democracy in the South and a disastrously developing central planned economy 
ruled by the Kim regime in the North. Like in the German past both governments 
claim to be the only representatives of the whole Korean people. (Kindermann 2008: 
8) But while Germany reunified after the collapse of the Cold War Korea remains the 
only divided nation worldwide. Hence the German unification gave a strong impact to 
Korean people to recognize that Korea could be reunified in the near future. But it is 
quite clear no one can expect the exact timing, as could be seen in the German case. 
(Park 2006, 42) But unification of the Korean peninsula is quite a natural, inevitable, 
and destined goal for all Koreans, in the South as well as in the North. Korea has 
been one nation state since ancient period. They use one language and had one 
common culture over 5,000 year-old history. Additionally, the division of the Korean 
peninsula was decided not by Koreans themselves but by external powers after the 
Japanese surrender. (Park 2006, 33 – 34) Also the experience of the Korean War 
cannot change these older facts, while of course it will hamper the emotional unifica-
tion process. (Yeon 1994: 244) Additionally, the economic and cultural gap between 
North and South Korea is significantly wider than the one between East and West 
Germany in 1990. GDP per capita was three times lower in the GDR compared to the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1990, while South Korea may be 20 to 30 times   4
richer than the North nowadays. (Herold 2002: 69) Taking this in consideration the 
realization of reunification of the Korean peninsula seems to be far from realism but 
who has expected soon unification of both German states in 1988? (Kindermann 
2008: 8) Additionally, further economic cooperation between North and South - like 
the Kaesong Industrial Park or the Mount Kumgang special economic zone – will lead 
to an influence of reform steps in North Korea to integration steps in the South and 
vice versa. 
 
Despite of all difficulties and steps back North Korea took first steps to reform its 
economic system since a few years. Theses reforms have been characterized by the 
introduction of some basic monetization into the economy and to reduce the role of 
the government in setting prices and controlling the distribution system. These 
changes in North Korea’s economic management and operational measures showed 
similarities to the processes that other transformation economies in Europe or Asia 
have gone through before. Additionally, the country is opening itself for investors as 
well as tourists. Special Economic Zones have been established, two in cooperation 
with South Korea. The possibility of directly comparing living standards as well as the 
economic and political situation in both parts of the country will inevitable lead people 
in North Korea to what the current leadership considers undesirable conclusions. 
(Wrobel 2007, 495 - 496) Despite of current confrontation between North and South 
Korea medium-dated the development on the Korean peninsula may shift into a 
situation like the post-cold-war period of cooperation in Europe, especially Germany, 
in the 1970s or 1980s. As Kim Dae-jung has pointed out himself his “Sunshine Pol-
icy” – characterized by cooperation with the North – was a trial to copy the “Ostpolitik” 
(politics toward the East) of German chancellor Willy Brand in the early 1970s. (Kin-
dermann 2008: 8) 
 
There are good reasons to compare also economic integration in Europe as well as 
in Northeast Asia. The coherence between integration and unification as well as 
transformation is a direct one. The European Union was deepening in the 1980s and 
1990s while Germany unified and started to transform the East German economy. 
Nowadays, South Korea is integrating into an Asian community and world free trade 
while North Korea is on its path to market reforms. Of course, there are remarkable 
differences. While European economic integration was always centered to the EU   5
(EEC, EC) East Asian economic cooperation is still a patchwork of bilateral agree-
ments. In Europe economic integration was accompanied by the development of a 
central bureaucracy - an institutional integration – relying on binding agreements 
among members. The most important was the 1992 Common Market Project. Unlike 
other regions in the world North East Asia has not devoted much energy to the estab-
lishment of a regional trading block for a long time. But effected by the Asian financial 
crisis, long-term recession in Japan and the WTO-accession of China nowadays the 
three countries of North East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are strengthening 
regional economic cooperation. (Lee 2004: 107) Indeed, in contrast to the concentric 
circles development of EU in East Asia a multitude of groupings can be identified. 
Historically, the most important were ASEAN and APEC while nowadays ASEAN + 3 
is dominating. (Pascha 2006, 39 - 51) Despite these remarkable differences in start-
ing conditions, historical paths, and present challenges, North East Asia can learn 
from European experiences.  
 
 
3.  German Experiences of Transformation and Integration 
3.1 Consequences of Integration for Transformation 
3.1.1 German Unification as Institutional Imitation Process 
 
Ever since the seminal discussion by Douglass C North (1990), the idea that institu-
tional development can be explained by competition between institutions has been 
analyzed by institutional economists. The impact of institutional competition as a 
Hayekian discovery procedure for new institutions [see Hayek (1969)], possible mar-
ket failure in institutional competition and the necessity of a competition system for 
institutional competition are some of the issues currently analyzed. Following this ar-
gumentation, transformation of economic systems can be defined as borderline-case 
of long-term institutional evolution, or – more concrete - as imitative as well as inno-
vative step within institutional competition. (Wrobel 2003: 383) As result, targets of 
transformation processes are endogenous variables. Political restrictions and public 
resistance must be taken in consideration. One main restriction of institutional devel-
opment is integration into political or economic organization (e.g. like the EU, ASEAN 
etc.). From an institutional point of view these organizations can be seen as “har-
monization cartels”. Additionally, it must be asked how far harmonization of formal in-  6
stitutions is hampering the economic development in transformation countries which 
are characterized by other informal institutions. Those informal institutions like a spe-
cific culture or behavior may be not compatible with elaborated market rules in devel-
oped market economies – or with overregulation and institutional sclerosis in welfare 
states. (Wrobel 2002: 65) 
 
Therefore German unification and EU membership of the former GDR in 1990 means 
becoming part of a harmonization cartel for Eastern Germany. At a first glance this 
included a lot of advantages for the transformation process. No tedious search for re-
form strategies was necessary. (Goedicke 2006: 44) A blueprint of the transformation 
path was given by the West German as well the European law. All West German 
formal institutions as well as the whole European “acquis communautaire” were di-
rectly transferred to East Germany. This took place within two steps. The first one 
was the German Monetary Union of 1990, July 1
st, the second German Unification of 
October 3
rd, including an interim phase intermediate. A common commitment of the 
GDR government to bring East German law into line with EU law during the interim 
period was self-evident. For instance, the GDR promised to introduce the European 
agricultural law immediately in July 1990. (Günther 2001: 168 – 183)  
 
The fast institutional transfer was enforced by the mass migration of East Germans to 
West Germany voting with their feet for the West German institutions. (Goedicke 
2006: 45) Between November 1989 and March 1990 more than 600.000 people from 
East Germany emigrated to the West. (Seliger and Wrobel 2000: 9) An economic col-
lapse of the GDR was imminent at this time. Therefore both governments agreed to 
introduce the Deutschmark, the West German civil and business law as well as the 
West German social security system in the GDR by the way of an economic and 
monetary union. By a low exchange rate of 1:1 or 1:2 of Deutschmark to GDR Mark 
purchasing power of East German consumers rose immediately, limiting the migra-
tion process soon. But the low exchange rate was a disaster for competitiveness of 
East German enterprises. (Goedicke 2006: 46) Additionally, there was only little time 
to establish a functioning administration in the GDR. From the European perspective 
it must be mentioned that the implementation of the Monetary Union in Germany af-
fected the German monetary coordination duty as member of the European Union. 
(Günther 2001: 157)    7
Formal reunification was negotiated together with the former oppression powers 
(USA, UK, France and the USSR) at this time. Formally unification took place by ac-
cession of fife newly found East German federal states according to article 23 of the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. (Goedicke 2006: 45) In the reunified 
Germany “Treuhandanstalt” (privatization agency) was instituted to privatize state as-
sets as soon as possible. (Brunner 1994: 329) Additionally, a functioning legal sys-
tem, access to capital markets as well as staff for top management positions in firms 
could be provided. This was unique among transformation countries. (Goedicke 
2006: 48) By this way the transfer of Western German political, economic and social 
institutions took place by a one-to-one imitation process within a very short time. 
Thus the East German transformation is a very good example of shock therapy. 
(Krakowski 1993: 17) This abrupt establishment of rule of law led to stable expecta-
tions for investors as well as for consumers. The disputes about law, the uncertainty 
about future investment, the weak enforcement of law, all this was absent in Eastern 
Germany. (Seliger and Wrobel 2000: 9) By this way reconstruction of the East Ger-




3.1.2 Adaptability of European Institutions 
 
But it is questionable if the legal framework of Western Germany and the EU was 
really adaptive for a transformation country like East Germany at this time. (Kra-
kowski 1993: 12) High standards of social and environmental regulation existed with-
out an immediate convergence of income in East Germany. (Seliger and Wrobel 
2000: 9) Thereby, a non-application of EU law in the new federal states during a 
transitional period was discussed. But to establish clear and equal rules within all of 
Germany the full application of EU law was decided. (Günther 2001: 73 – 74) Until 
October 1990 about 80 percent of the acquis communautaire was implemented in 
Eastern Germany. (Günter 2001: 203) Only a few exceptions were made, e.g. a tem-
porary permission of the East German “Trabbi”, a car not complying with EU emis-
sion standards. (Günther 2001: 204) However, this led to a breakdown in production 
in the Eastern part of Germany because of non-compliance of environmental regula-
tions and too high social contributions. Too high wages because of the chosen con-  8
version rate induced a process of industrial breakdown and firing. This process was 
strengthened by the introduction of all social regulations including the adoption of the 
West German labor relations and the most inflexible West German labor law. (Fichter 
1997: 395) As result, unemployment rose rapidly. Additionally, EU overregulation 
overstrained East German enterprises. Knowledge deficits and suboptimal adapta-
tion, e.g. in the fields of promotion of industry, institutional limitations for new entre-
preneurs etc. hampered the economic development in East Germany. Indeed, most 
East Germans knew West German formal institutions from West German TV. But it 
turned out later, that the perception of this information was often distorted. (Kra-
kowski 1993: 19) For instance a lot of East Germans were advantaged by West 
German insurance agents in the first month of economic unification. Additionally, in-
formal institutions were quite different in East and West Germany. Different behavior 
as well as philosophy of life can be detected until now. In contrast successful trans-
formation states like Estonia started by implementing very simple rules of a market 
economy. For instance a flat tax was chosen. The first competition law contained only 
a few pages. (Wrobel 2000, 182) By this way the learning process was simplified in 
Estonia. People got time to understand the new rules and to build up an adaptive 
system of formal institutions compatible to their informal institutions. Coincidentally 
they could learn and adapt their informal institutions step by step. This led to an inno-
vative adaptation of Western market economy rules. 
 
By the formal German unification the former GDR became part of the European Sin-
gle Market which is characterized by four freedoms. The idea of the Single Market is 
that all goods, services, investments and people can move without restrictions. The 
Single Market was introduced into the GDR by an EU-GDR tariff union of July 1990. 
(Günther 2001: 223) Fortunately, the Federal Republic of Germany had exempted 
the inner-German trade from European law by negotiations already in 1957. By this 
way the introduction of European foreign trade law by the German monetary union 
was not problematic from the EU point of view. But while already in summer 1990 
trade barriers to Western Europe where abolished by the implementation of the union 
coincidentally tariffs and quotas were introduced for GDR foreign trade relative to 
third countries. (Günther 2001: 174 - 187) For the East German enterprises the Sin-
gle Market meant a lot of advantages but also disadvantages. Main advantage was 
the chance to export goods as well as services into the rest of EU without tariffs or   9
other restrictions. (Günther 2001: 71) Because markets in Central and Eastern 
Europe, e.g. in Russia, broke away in these times the free access to new large sales 
markets in Western Europe cannot be underestimated. Of course, directly after reuni-
fication also exports from Eastern Germany to the West collapsed because most 
products were too expensive when former subsidization by administered exchange 
rates came to an end. (Hax 2003: 27) But during a process of adaptation openness 
became a privilege other Central and Eastern European states could not enjoy as 
soon as East Germany. They had to negotiate different agreements with the Euro-
pean Union and full membership was achieved only in 2004 respective 2007, more 
than a decade after the beginning of transformation. Additionally, fast opening to the 
EU can be seen as incentive for trade-oriented investors to build up new enterprises 
in East Germany where labor costs were low but free transfer of goods and services 
allowed. Coincidently, free movement of capital within the Single Market facilitated 
the flow of foreign direct investments to Eastern Germany from all over Europe. 
(Günther 2001: 71) 
 
In contrast, free Europe-wide working migration supported the brain drain from East-
ern Germany. But because of the common German language and culture the emigra-
tion of young and well educated people from Eastern Germany targeted first to West 
Germany. Migration into the rest of EU was insignificant. Additionally, East Germany 
lost control of its borders and protective duties. Foreign enterprises got the same 
conditions for access to the East German market as to other markets in the European 
Union. (Goedicke 2006: 47) Already by implementation of the German monetary un-
ion prices of tradable goods in East Germany tied to prices in West Germany and the 
rest of the European Union. An exchange rate would have maintained flexibility of 
domestic prices but this flexibility disappeared with the monetary union. (Hax 2003: 
21) By this way European as well as West German competition pressurized East 
German enterprises. Until now there exists a lack of competitiveness in Eastern 
Germany. Especially in the first years after unification productivity was low (e.g. 60% 
of West Germany in 1996). (Watrin 1998: 59) Also yet, industries with a higher level 
of productivity than in West Germany are still exceptions. (Goedicke 2006: 61) 
Wages were too high because of money conversion by 1:1. Also East German enter-
prises lacked time for reconstruction and improvement of efficiency. (Lichtblau 1998:   10
156 - 159) Additionally, all these negative aspects of unifying an economically divided 
nation were strengthened by the integration of West Germany into the EU. 
 
The German government tried to cushion these disadvantages by different subsidies 
for East German enterprises. But the Single Market includes European competition 
policy which is – among other things – characterized by a lot of restraints of national 
subsidies. These restraints are assumed as distortion of the functioning of the Single 
Market. Thereby already in the interim phase in summer 1990 the West German 
Government had to take EU aid regulations into consideration while subsidizing the 
GDR economy. (Günther 2001: 194) Also after reunification it was not possible to 
support the new federal states by implementation of special tax incentives for inves-
tors like Poland has done in its special economic zones. (Deichmann 2005) Thereby 
it was necessary for the German Government to negotiate temporary exemptions 
from harmonized EC-law for so-called “einigungsbedingte Lasten” (unification costs). 
Anyway, European aid law limited the possibilities of East German transformation in 
a lot of economic fields, e.g. in the sphere of privatization. The Treuhandanstalt, the 
German privatization agency, supported East German enterprises by credits, guaran-
tees, and equity capital flows. Therefore the Treuhandanstalt was supervised by the 
EU Commission. For instance, a disposal of state enterprises below par was prohib-
ited. (Günther 2001: 248) In contrast, subsidies for the shipbuilding industry in Meck-
lenburg-Western-Pomerania as well as for iron and steel industry in all of Eastern 
Germany were allowed as special and temporary regulation. (Günther 2001: 249 – 
250) However, the possible path of development – the window of opportunity – be-
came smaller by the influence of the harmonization cartel EU. Some innovative 
measures of institutional competition were not possible in the German case. 
 
Often European agricultural as well as structural policy has been mentioned as main 
reasons for Central and Eastern European states to join the EU. But as the German 
case shows they were advantageous as well as disadvantageous for the transforma-
tion process in Eastern Germany. By this elaborated system of subsidies social and 
environmental projects, agricultural production, restoration of countless houses and 
monuments as well as improvement of infrastructure in Eastern Germany could be 
supported. (Watrin 1998: 49) From 1991 to 1993 structural funds support for Eastern 
Germany was one core measure of EU regional policy. Goal of this measure was the   11
fast integration of the new federal states in Eastern Germany into the community. 
Supported were infrastructural measures, productive investments, the development 
of the agricultural sector, as well as all measures supporting the development of labor 
markets. (Günther 2001: 232 – 240) Between 1990 and 2006 the New Federal States 
enjoyed a 17.9 billion Euro inflow from Brussels, of course, only a small transfer 
compared with 980 billion Euros transferred from Western Germany in this period 
(1990 – 2003). (Goedicke 2006: 51) On the other hand, already in the interim period 
in summer 1990 the GDR had to implement the European agricultural law, including 
pegging of agricultural prices and agricultural foreign trade regulations. (Günther 
2001: 187) This can be designated as a typical case of implementing overregulation 
into a transformation country. As result of subsidizing and overregulation no self-
feeding economic recovery took place in Eastern Gewrmany. Until now East German 
federal states are dependent on transfers. While living standard is rising continuously 
the dependence of East Germany from aid from the West is strengthened. Compared 
with East European countries standard of living is much higher but self-confidence of 
East Germans is low. The feeling of being a citizen of second class is common in 
East Germany while Polish or Hungarian people are proud on their economic devel-
opment and the rise of their standards of living. Therefore economic sense of subsi-
dizing a transformation country is questionable. 
 
 
3.2  Consequences of Transformation for Integration 
 
Transformation and integration is a double-sided challenge. While integration influ-
ences transformation processes also transformation may influence the integration 
process itself. Disturbance of the integration process may occur by the decision of 
one integrated partner state to unify with a transformation state. German unification 
was such a case. Other member states of the European Union had to accept German 
unification juridically as well as politically. (Günther 2001: 162 - 170) At this time it 
was not obvious that German unification would have also economic results for other 
members of the EU as well as for the deepening of the integration process at all. Be-
cause the GDR was quite small compared to the rest of EU no direct negative influ-
ence of the transformation process on the integration process could be recognized. 
But there were some changes in the political as well as economic behavior of Ger-  12
many as a reunified, enlarged and partly transforming state. Especially European 
monetary and fiscal cooperation suffered from German unification in the following 
decades.  
 
A first indicator for change in the monetary behavior of Bundesbank, the German 
central bank, was its behavior in the disturbance of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1992, only two years after German unification. The EMS was characterized 
by fixed exchange rates between the European currencies. Indeed, there existed a 
symmetric commitment of central bank interventions but the German Deutschmark 
was dominating currency. In contrast to the years before since 1978 realignments 
were scarce and inflation in some member states required a devaluation of their cur-
rency. While German Bundesbank in the past has managed monetary policy mostly 
in cooperation with its European partners, in 1992 - because of different needs as a 
newly unified economy - it raised base rates. By this way a financial crisis was in-
duced, which hampered – but fortunately did not stop – the process of monetary in-
tegration in Europe. As planned in 1999 the Euro as common European currency 
was implemented. But negotiated criteria for membership in the European Monetary 
Union were weakened by the crisis. As reaction on the crisis in 1992 the European 
governments decided to enlarge the fluctuation band of EMS currencies from regular 
+/- 2.25 percent to +/- 15.00 percent with exception of the Gulden-Deutschmark rela-
tion. (Krugman and Obstfeld 2006: 709) By this way one of fife criteria for member-
ship in the European Monetary Union was softened fundamentally. As result the 
European process of monetary integration was not satisfactory from an economic 
point of view and the implementation of the Euro was too fast. 
 
One decade later, between 2002 and 2005, Germany as most powerful economy in 
Europe failed to maintain fiscal stability because of financial problems in relation with 
the economic development in Eastern Germany. In 1992 the German government 
negotiated the European Stability and Growth Pact which required maintenance of all 
fiscal and monetary criteria for members of the Euro area. Beside other criteria an 
annual maximum budget deficit of 3.0 percent of GDP and a maximum national debt 
of 60 percent of GDP should be matched. Members not maintaining these criteria 
should undergo punishment by the European Union. But when Germany as main ini-
tiator of the Stability and Growth Pact failed, the enforceability of the pact became   13
impossible. During a recession not only Germany but also different other European 
states like France did not match the criteria, but punishment was not carried through. 
From 2002 to 2005 German budget deficit amounted for 3.3 to 3.8 percent of GDP. 
Reason was a dramatic end of a short economic unification boom in the second half 
of the 1990s. (Goedicke 2006: 47) Until this time the costs of reunification had been 
underestimated. Now problems of unification like long-term need of transfers for East 
Germany, migration of young and educated people from East Germany to the West, 
high unemployment rates in the new federal states got priority. As result fiscal stabil-
ity in Germany suffered influencing fiscal stability in Europe, too. 
 
In the last years the European integration process was dominated by enlargement 
but deepening came to a hopefully only immediate standstill. Since the breakdown of 
the Berlin wall in 1989 not only East Germany became part of the European Union. In 
2004 ten countries – eight from Central and Eastern Europe – joined the Union (Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Slovenia 
accompanied by Malta and Cyprus). In 2007 Romania as well as Bulgaria followed. 
In contrast to the eastern enlargement of the European Union German reunification 
was only negligible. But German unification as well as eastern enlargement is ac-
companied by large integration costs – of course in different dimension. They have 
been already mentioned as advantage for transformation countries: subsidies from 
the Common Agricultural as well as Structural Funds. Because the European Union 
is not only a free trade area but additionally characterized by political as well as insti-
tutional integration new members can claim to the same subsidies like old members. 
But someone has to pay these subsidies. In the German case covering of these costs 
was unproblematic because of the small size of East Germany. But as one can imag-
ine integration of a large number of transformation states – like the European eastern 
enlargement in 2004 – can arise to a financial problem for the old members of the in-
tegration area.  
 
Last but not least the effects of unrestricted immigration from a transformation coun-
try into the integration area should be discussed again. As has been mentioned 
above in the German case migration between East and West was mainly restricted to 
the enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. But as the experience of EU eastern 
enlargement in 2004 has shown migration from poor transformation states like Po-  14
land or the Baltic States into richer welfare states like the UK or Ireland occurs if 
these do not achieve limitations. West Germany as well as the UK or Ireland bene-
fited from immigration from the East. Mostly, migrants were young, well educated, 
and motivated. By this way old welfare states in the West could solve partly demo-
graphical problems, add complementary supply on the labor market, and by this way 
improve economic growth. (Hansen 2007: 10 - 12) But at all, integration of transfor-
mation countries into an integration area must be evaluated as double-sided: in the 




4.  Lessons for Korea 
If Korean reunification will occur in the near future is questionable. At the time only a 
“one country, two systems” approach seems to bee possible. But also by further eco-
nomic cooperation between North and South reform steps in North Korea and inte-
gration steps in South will influence each other. Especially the integration of Kaesong 
Industrial Park into South Korean free trade agreements with diverse countries in the 
world is a good example. Because economic integration within the framework of 
ASEAN+3 – including financial cooperation as well as a growing degree of free trade 
in East Asia - is top of the agenda in South Korea the problem seems worth of dis-
cussion.  
 
Already in 2000 an East Asia Vision Group proposed an East Asia wide free trade ar-
rangement or closer economic partnership including liberalization of trade in all 
goods, services, investments, and mutual recognition arrangements. Additionally, 
separate agreements and cooperation on anti-dumping measures, competition policy, 
investment principles, dispute settlement, and capacity building were proposed. In 
2001 the Vision Group submitted a draft version of an East Asian Community with a 
common regional currency and free trade among its members. (Tongzon 2004: 143) 
At the ASEAN+3 summit in 2001 South Korea initiated dialogue in the creation of an 
East Asian economic community or EAFTA (East Asia Free Trade Area). (Lee 2004: 
108) By this way, the process of East Asian integration is on its way. Therefore it has 
to be asked which experiences from the German case can be transferred to Korea. 
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Despite current cooling down of North South relations a long-term process of unifica-
tion seems to be the most probable path of development on the Korean peninsula. A 
monetary and economic union like in the German case may be decided in the future 
as well as a “one country, two systems” approach. At the moment a political and eco-
nomic collapse of the North cannot be expected. By this way a time lasting Korean in-
tegration process based on political as well economic cooperation is to be assumed. 
Thereby the first question to be asked is if an institutional imitation process like in the 
German / European case seems to be a promising approach for North Korea. A one 
to one imitation of institutions like in the German case may be successful or not de-
pending on the adaptability of formal institutions. In the German case e.g. inflexibility 
of West German labor market institutions has been mentioned as example for non-
adaptability. Overregulation of the European Union in diverse fields completed this.  
 
In the Korean case we have to ask if South Korean institutions themselves are well 
functioning and should be transferred to the North. For instance the financial sector 
with personal relationships and government priorities as the dominating criteria to ob-
tain credit, seems not to be perfect as model for a transformation country. (Herold 
2002: 73) Economic integration into a community of East Asian nations may improve 
the situation in South Korea requiring changing institutions in the financial sector. Be-
cause financial cooperation in East Asia is pioneering economic integration positive 
aspects for Korean financial cooperation in the future can be expected. Positive insti-
tutions can be channelled through South Korea to the North by this way. 
 
On the other hand, a common Asian legal framework – especially basic common 
ideas like the protection of private property – may be not advantageous in the Korean 
case. While in East Germany private property was mostly restituted in line with West 
German and European law in the Korean case restitution is not possible. Big land-
owners from the Japanese colonial times in Korea - collaborators as well as Japa-
nese citizens - would be the first to have legal titles to demand restitution of their pri-
vate property in North Korea. But such kind of restitution would not be in the sense of 
the Korean people. (Shin and No 1996: 98) Permanent uncertainties for investors in 
North Korea would be an additional disadvantage for the transformation process. 
(Park 1993: 38) In the case of deeper economic and political cooperation in Eastern 
Asia – anyway integrating North Korea - the bilateral acceptance of legal principles   16
may include the protection of private property. This can be seen as an advantage 
relative to FDIs into the North Korean special economic zones as well as into the rest 
of the country in the future. But in the case of a North Korean transformation and 
opening process coincidentally pretensions of former big landowners from Japan may 
be supported by such a common law. In Germany for instance since a few years the 
“Preussische Treuhand” (Prussian Trust) disturbs the Polish – German relations by 
claiming restitution or compensation of private property in the former Eastern prov-
inces of Germany. While German – Polish agreements exclude restitution and com-
pensation of former German owners the European Union demanded a Polish restitu-
tion law. (Wrobel 2002: 64) 
 
As has been mentioned German transformation was characterized by one to one imi-
tation of West German as well as European rule of law. By this way no search for 
transformation strategies was necessary. But it is questionable if North South coop-
eration on the Korean peninsula must lead to such an import of stability in North Ko-
rea to enforce economic development and transformation. Not only the Chinese or 
Vietnamese but even the South Korean example has shown that East Asian coun-
tries can develop under a dictatorship into a market economy. Rule of law and de-
mocracy in the Western sense are not unconditionally necessary. While rule of law is 
precondition for the development of a market economy in Germany it does not seem 
to be precondition in East Asia. A substitution by power of state and the ruling party 
like in China or Vietnam is possible. (Schäfer 2008: 11) By this way no political 
change is necessary for economic stabilization in North Korea and a transformation 
without “Big-bang”-unification is possible.  
 
Stabilization of the North Korean transformation process can occur in the future by in-
tegration into the East Asian community through special economic zones (like Kae-
song, Rajin-Sonbong etc.), free trade agreements, improvement of financial coopera-
tion etc. The South Korean government should try to integrate the North South dia-
logue into an East Asian integration dialogue. As has been pointed out already, the 
Federal Republic of Germany exempted the inner-German trade from European law 
by negotiations already in 1957. (Günther 2001: 25) This may be the right strategy for 
South Korea, too. 
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In contrast to the German case a step-by-step integration during the reform or trans-
formation process seems to be advantageous. While East Germany had to suffer 
from immediate implemented high social as well as ecological standards North Korea 
has the chance to implement such standards within an East Asian integration proc-
ess step by step. Fortunately, at the moment East Asian integration is a patchwork of 
free trade agreements and financial cooperation. By this way, no overregulation or 
complexity of institutions will affect a North Korean reform process. Indeed, North Ko-
rea cannot participate in East Asian free trade without interim period. Korean coop-
eration projects like Kaesong Industrial Complex can help to integrate the North Ko-
rean economy into world trade in the long term. Of course, the North Korean special 
economic zones and cooperation projects are only a first step into the right direction. 
 
Assuming a “one country, two systems” approach or an immediate Korean unification 
in the future South Korean economic integration will be helpful for transformation in 
North Korea. Already, if free exports of goods produced in Kaesong are possible 
within an ASEAN+3 free trade area in the future this will support North Korean trans-
formation. Of course, a political change in North Korea, away from confrontation to 
cooperation, and as result an abolishment of US sanctions would be necessary to 
benefit from such export possibilities. (Herold 2002, 76) The North Korean situation 
would be privileged in contrast to other Asian countries which have to sign free trade 
agreements itself with all other ASEAN+3 countries. Additionally, free movement of 
capital (FDIs) within an East Asian economic community can support the develop-
ment of Korean cooperation projects like Kaesong. By an opening for FDIs from all 
over Asia Kaesong Industrial Complex as well as other planned cooperation projects 
on the Korean peninsula can benefit. Indeed, a deeper North South cooperation and 
additional trust building in Korea is a necessary precondition. Additionally, within an 
interim period the North Korean industry should be protected from international com-
petitive pressure because its efficiency is lacking behind enormously. (Herold 2002, 
74) Cooperation by special economic zones seems to be a good first-step approach 
to achieve both targets attracting investments and supporting exports on the one 
hand as well as protecting North Korean industries from international competition on 
the other hand. 
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The Asian integration process is an open process at the moment. As patchwork of 
different ideas, integration steps, free trade agreements etc. for South Korea it is 
possible to avoid a non-adaptive legal framework in the future. Thereby the South 
Korean government should focus on real free trade in future negotiations. Addition-
ally, it should try to integrate RoK-DPRK-cooperation projects into the agreements if 
possible. In contrast, such agreements should explicitly not focus on social or envi-
ronmental regulations. Overregulation within the integration area must be avoided as 
well as harmonization steps of tax competition like regulations of special economic 
zones or tax rates. These regulations would hamper an inter-Korean cooperation and 
unification process. Also subsidies in case of transformation must be allowed within 
an integration area. For instance, the German Government stabilized the East Ger-
man agricultural market since 1990 by subsidies and market interventions. (Kim 
1997, 55) Subsidies for industry and services followed soon. But spending subsidies 
is problematic within the legal EU framework. It is a very important challenge to the 
South Korean government to implement rules of integration only if they leave enough 
institutional range for innovative steps in the case of unification, cooperation and 
transformation.  
 
If Korea will unify anyway migration will probably take place within the Korean penin-
sula. A brain drain from the North can be expected like in the German case. But also 
like in the German case other countries will not be effected noticeably. In order to 
minimize migration from North Korea to the South realistic short as well as medium 
term commitments in regard to food supply, improvements in health conditions, and 
infrastructure projects with immediate positive impact for the people have to be com-
municated to the North Koreans. (Herold 2002: 71) Integrated or not South Korea will 
have to take the full burden. Additionally, further transfers to North Korea must be 
paid by the South alone because there exists no structural policy in East Asia. By this 
way, a self-feeding economic development may occur in North Korea simplifying a 
political unification as well as economic unification in the future.  
 
On the other hand it seems to be improbable that Korean cooperation as well as uni-
fication will hamper the Asian integration process. In contrast to Germany South Ko-
rea isn’t economic or monetary leader of the integration community. Compared with 
China or Japan Korea as a whole is small in political as well as in economic terms.   19
No disturbances of monetary, fiscal or political integration can be expected. This will 
help South Korea to carry through unification without opposition from other integrated 
countries in East Asia. Inter-Korean cooperation projects, interim periods as well as 
institutional exceptions for the North can be negotiated by the South Korean govern-





Summarizing the experiences from Germany unification we have to point on a lot of 
advantages as well as disadvantages of coincident European integration. While imita-
tion of West German institutions and the European acquis communautaire estab-
lished functioning formal rules of a market economy as soon as possible in Eastern 
Germany flexibility of adaptation of these rules left a lot to be desired. High social and 
environmental standards strengthened the crisis of transformation because of its in-
adaptability with the needs of a transformation country. On the other hand East Ger-
many was stabilized by the fast implementation of market rules and the West Ger-
man currency.  
 
The European Single Market enabled East German enterprises to export their prod-
uct to the West instead of breaking down markets in the East. This was a privilege in 
contrast to other East European transformation states. But by this way also East 
German enterprises had to suffer from European competitive pressure without interim 
phase. Also the results of European policy fields like competition policy, structural 
policy or agricultural policy are double-sided. While the European Union spent a lot of 
money to support the transformation process in Eastern Germany it hampered Ger-
man subsidy spending because of disturbances in the Single Market. Surprisingly, 
despite of large amounts of West German as well as European subsidies no self-
feeding economic recovery took place in East Germany until now. 
 
Lessons to be learned from the German case are a lot. First South Korea can im-
prove own institutions by the Asian integration process, institutions which may be 
later transferred to the North in the case of transformation or unification. Interesting is 
the question if the rule of law – precondition of successful transformation in Europe –   20
is necessary in East Asia, too. But also disturbances of transformation steps in North 
Korea can be expected. For instance, the protection of private property may be lead 
to problems in the case of Korean unification if Japanese landowners from colonial 
times claim for the restitution of their private property in the North. Additionally, over-
regulation and non-adaptive regulations in an East Asian integration area may disturb 
the reform or transformation steps in North Korea. Therefore it is necessary for the 
South Korean government to integrate all cooperation steps with the North into FTAs 
or other integration agreements. On the other hand, no disturbances of the East 
Asian integration process by inter-Korean cooperation, unification and transformation 
is to be expected because Korea is economically small in contrast to its large 
neighbors China and Japan. Therefore the South Korean government should support 
economic reforms in North Korea while ensuring of present cooperation projects as 



































Brunner, Hans-Peter (1994) “Towards an evolutionary strategy for eastern devel-
opment: lessons of the economic transformation in Germany and Poland”, in: In-
ternationale Politik und Gesellschaft, pp. 329-342.  
Deichmann, Joel I. (2005) “Special economic zones and foreign direct investment. 
Poland”. Applied economics quarterly, Vol. 51, 1, pp.83-106.  
Diewald, Martin; Goedicke, Anne; Mayer, Karl (2006) “After the fall of the Wall: life 
courses in the transformation of East Germany”, Stanford, Calif. 
Fichter, Michael (1997) “Institutional transfer and the transformation of labour rela-
tions in East(ern) Germany: lessons for Central and Eastern Europe? ”, in: Trans-
fer, Vol. 3, 2, pp. 390-407. 
Goedicke, Anne (2006) A “Ready-Made-State”: The Mode of Institutional Transition 
in East Germany after 1989, in: Diewald, Martin; Goedicke, Anne; Mayer, Karl 
(ed.): “After the fall of the Wall: life courses in the transformation of East Germa-
ny”, Stanford, Calif. 
Günther, Thomas (2001) Die gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Aspekte der Eingliederung 
der neuen deutschen Bundesländer und der zum ehemaligen Ost-Berlin gehö-
renden Bezirke in die Europäischen Gemeinschaften“, Sinzheim.  
Hansen, R. (2007) ”Länderprofil Vereinigtes Königreich“, focus Migration Länderprofil 
Nr. 12 (Dezember 2007). 
Hax, Herbert (2003) “Economic transformation in East Germany: has economic the-
ory been helpful? ”, in: Challenges to the world economy, pp.17-31. 
Hayek, Friedrich August von (1969) “Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren”, 
in: Freiburger Studien, Freiburg. 
Herold, Lars (2002) “Building a market economy in North Korea and Vietnam: key 
lessons from the Chinese, Russian, and German experiences”, Aachen. 
Kim, Kyung-Ryang (1997) “Die Erfahrungen der deutschen Wiedervereinigung im 
Agrarsektor: eine Lehre für Korea?”, in: Kyongsang-nonch'ong, Vol. 16, pp.35-66. 
Kindermann, Gottfried-Karl (2008) “Der Traum von der Einheit bleibt lebendig”, in: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 18, 2008, p. 8. 
Krakowski, Michael (1993) “Systems transformation and system integration in East-
ern Germany and Eastern Europe: some lessons”, in: Two years since German 
unification, pp. 9-29. 
Krugman, Paul; Obstfeld, Maurice (2006) Internationale Wirtschaft, 7
th ed., Mün-
chen. 
Lee Jong-won (2004) The Possibility of and Prospects for a China-Japan-South Ko-
rea FTA: the Lessons from European Integration, in: Schönfisch, Karl-Peter; 
Seliger, Bernhard [ed.] “ASEAN plus three (China, Japan, Korea) – towards an 
economic union in East Asia?”, Seoul – Singapore, pp. 107 – 139. 
Lichtblau, Karl (1998) “Privatisation of state-owned enterprises in former socialist 
states: lessons from the German experience”, in: Policy priorities for the unified 
Korean economy, pp. 153-187. 
North, Douglas (1990) “Institutions, Institutional change and Economic Perform-
ance”, Cambridge. 
Pascha, Werner (2006) Economic Integration in East Asia and Europe – A Compari-
son, in: Schönfisch, Karl-Peter; Seliger, Bernhard [ed.] “ASEAN plus three 
(China, Japan, Korea) – towards an economic union in East Asia?”, Seoul – Sin-
gapore, pp. 39 - 60.   22
Park, Sung-hoon (1993) “German economy after unification: facts, prospects and 
implications for Korea”, Seoul. 
Park, Tae-gyun (2006) “What is German Experience for Koreans?: Research on Uni-
fication in Korea”, in: Oh, Yean-cheon; Lee, Dalgon; Seliger, Bernhard; Park, 
Sung-jo [ed.]: The Unification Research and Strategy in Korea and Germany: Af-
finity and Specificity, Seoul, pp. 31 – 52.  
Schäfer, Hans-Bernd (2008) Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Wachstum, in: Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, July 19
th 2008, p. 11. 
Seliger, Bernhard / Wrobel, Ralph (2000) “German Unification: the Valuable Les-
sons”, in: The Baltic Review – Quarterly Magazine, Vol. 20, 2000, pp. 8 – 11. 
Shin, Kyung-hwan; No Young-kon (1996) “Privatisierungsprobleme bei der Trans-
formation von der Planwirtschaft zur Marktwirtschaft: im Fall Ostdeutschlands und 
Nordkoreas”, in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Vol. 13, pp. 73-111. 
Tongzon Jose l. (2004) “ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN Economic Integration”, in: Schön-
fisch, Karl-Peter; Seliger, Bernhard [ed.] “ASEAN plus three (China, Japan, Ko-
rea) – towards an economic union in East Asia?”, Seoul – Singapore, pp.141 – 
159. 
Watrin, Christian (1998) Monetary Integration and Stabilization Policy: The German 
Case, in: Il Sa-kong; Kim Kwang-suk (ed.): Policy Priorities fort he Unified Korean 
Economy, pp.48 – 64. 
Wrobel, Ralph (2000) Estland und Europa: Die Bedeutung des Systemwettbewerbs 
für die Evolution und Transformation von Wirtschaftssystemen, Tartu. 
Wrobel, Ralph (2002) “Die „doppelte Transformationsproblematik“ als besondere 
Herausforderung im Ostseeraum”, in: G. Braun; Chr. Diensberg (ed.): Entrepre-
neurship im Ostseeraum – Unternehmertum als Motor von Wachstum und Integ-
ration, Berlin, pp. 49 – 70.  
Wrobel, Ralph (2003) “Transformationsprozesse aus Sicht der evolutorischen Öko-
nomik”, in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 3, pp. 380 – 398. 
Wrobel, Ralph (2007) “North Korea after the Nuclear Crisis: The Future of the Eco-
nomic Reforms, in: Post-Communist Economires, Vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 483 – 504. 
Yeon, Ha-cheong (1994) “Economic consequences of German unification and its 
policy implications for Korea”, in: Integration and disintegration in Europe and 








 Ordnungspolitische Diskurse 
Discourses in Social Market Economy 
 
2007 – 1  Seliger, Bernhard; Wrobel, Ralph – Die Krise der Ordnungspolitik als 
 Kommunikationskrise 
2007 – 2  Sepp, Jüri - Estland – eine ordnungspolitische Erfolgsgeschichte?  
2007 – 3   Eerma, Diana; Sepp, Jüri - Competition Policy’s Role in Network Indus-
tries - Regulation and Deregulation in Estonia  
2007 – 4   Claphman, Ronald -  Welche Bedeutung haben nationale Wirtschafts-
ordnungen  
für die Zukunft der EU? Der Beitrag der sozialen Marktwirtschaft  
2007 – 5   Strunz, Herbert – Staat, Wirtschaften und Governance  
2007 – 6   Jang Tae-Seok - South Korea’s Aid to North Korea’s Transformation  
Process - Social Market Perspective  
2007 – 7   Libman, Alexander - Big Business and Quality of Institutions in the Post-  
Soviet Space: Spatial Aspects  
2007 – 8   Mulaj, Isa - Forgotten Status of Many: Kosovo’s Economy under the UN  
and the EU Administration  
2007 – 9   Dathe, Uwe - Wettbewerb ohne Wettbewerb? Über die Bedeutung von  
Reformen im Bildungswesen für die Akzeptanz der Wettbewerbsidee  
2007 – 10   Noltze, Karl - Die ordnungspolitische Strategie  
2008 – 1   Seliger, Bernhard - Die zweite Welle – ordnungspolitische Herausforde-
rungen der ostasiatischen Wirtschaftsentwicklung  
2008 – 2   Gemper, Bodo Rheinische Wegbereiter der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft:  
Charakter zeigen im Aufbruch  
2008 – 3   Decouard, Emmanuel - Das „Modèle rhénan“ aus französischer Sicht  
2008 – 4   Backhaus, Jürgen - Gilt das Coase Theorem auch in den neuen Län-
dern  
2008 – 5   Ahrens, Joachim - Transition towards a Social Market Economy? Limits  
and Opportunities  
2008 – 6   Wrobel, Ralph - Sonderwirtschaftszonen im internationalen Wettbewerb 
der Wirtschaftssysteme: ordnungspolitisches Konstrukt oder Motor insti-
tutionellen Wandels  
2009 – 1   Wrobel, Ralph - The Double Challenge of Transformation and Integra-
tion: German Experiences and Consequences for Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 